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Decision Makers and
Decision Recipients:
Understanding Disparities in the Meaning of Fairness
Diane Sivasubramaniam and Larry Heuer

In an extensive body of research on the psychology of fairness, psychologists have investigated factors that determine
people’s satisfaction with conflict resolution processes. Early
research on the psychology of fairness focused on distributive
fairness. These early studies examined people’s beliefs that the
outcomes of their conflicts were fair, and showed that disputants’ satisfaction with conflict resolution was more strongly
influenced by the fairness than the favorability of the outcomes
they received.2 However, research on the psychology of fairness shifted to a focus on procedural fairness when Thibaut and
Walker demonstrated that disputants’ satisfaction with conflict
resolution was influenced by the fairness of the conflict reso-

lution procedures, as well as the fairness of the outcomes produced by those procedures.3
Importantly, Thibaut and Walker showed that disputants
judged procedures to be fair to the extent that they felt they
were granted “voice” or input into the procedure, and influence over the process. Their theory of procedural fairness
posited that process control was a critical determinant of disputants’ judgments of procedural fairness and satisfaction.
Since this research was conducted in high conflict settings
(simulated legal disputes), it was assumed that disputants valued “voice” or process control because they were motivated to
obtain fair outcomes, and therefore preferred procedures that
permitted them to express their views and to be influential in
shaping those outcomes.
Although this theory was well supported, some findings did
not fit well with Thibaut and Walker’s reasoning about why
voice was important to disputants. Their procedural justice
theory predicted that process control was important because of
its potential instrumental value—it increased the likelihood of
obtaining fair and beneficial outcomes. However, subsequent
research showed that voice enhanced fairness judgments even
when disputants did not think their voice would influence
their outcome.4 This non-instrumental voice effect led two
psychologists, Tom Tyler and E. Allan Lind, to propose a group
value theory of procedural fairness. This theory has profoundly influenced subsequent research and theory on procedural fairness.
Tyler and Lind’s research was supportive of their claim that
certain non-instrumental procedural features were particularly
influential for people’s evaluations of these processes: trustworthy authorities, neutral procedures, and respectful treatment. If disputants felt that the authority figure in a procedure
was trustworthy, the procedure was neutral, and the disputant’s
rights were generally respected in the procedure, then the disputants generally judged the procedure to be fair.5
According to the group value model of procedural fairness,
this occurs because such procedural features convey to disputants that they are valued and respected members of their
valued social groups. When a procedure conveys that a person
is valued by their group, and that they are held in high regard
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S

ince World War II, psychologists have devoted considerable attention to understanding the factors that shape
people’s satisfaction with the outcomes of social or economic exchanges—outcomes of events not unlike the encounters occurring between judges and litigants in civil and criminal courtrooms, encounters between police officers and civilians, or encounters between mediators and disputants in alternative dispute resolution centers throughout the United States
every day. In one classic early study, it came as somewhat of a
surprise when it was discovered that satisfaction was not easily explained by economic theories of human behavior.1 This
finding launched an inquiry guided by theories and empirical
research that has continued to this day.
In this article, we offer an overview of the major developments in these theories and the accompanying research with an
eye toward their implications for understanding the factors that
shape citizens’ satisfaction with the U.S. legal system. Then, we
note that the vast majority of this research has focused primarily on only a portion of the individuals who are engaged in the
legal encounters that are taking place—the subordinates (the
litigants, civilians, and disputants whose outcomes are being
decided) rather than the authorities (the judges, police officers,
and mediators who are deciding the cases), and we describe
some recent research suggesting that the satisfaction of decision
makers might be guided by different principles than the satisfaction of those who receive their decisions.
DEVELOPMENT OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS RESEARCH
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by the authorities representing that social group, then that person will generally judge that procedure to be fair. Essentially,
the group value model posits that people do not judge procedures to be fair because those procedures deliver fair or favorable outcomes, and people do not value procedural features
like voice or respectful treatment because they signal the likelihood of favorable outcomes. Rather, procedural features like
trust, neutrality, respect (and voice) convey important symbolic or relational information—they convey that the individual is respected by his or her group—prompting people to
judge those procedures as fair.6 An extensive body of research
provides strong support for these central claims of the group
value model.
Notably, the ascendancy of the group value model in the
procedural fairness literature is the culmination of a significant
shift from the parameters that defined early conflict research.
Psychologists have progressed from early economic models of
satisfaction that focused primarily on obtaining favorable outcomes, to distributive fairness models that focused primarily on
obtaining fair outcomes, to procedural fairness models that
focused primarily on procedures as instruments for shaping fair
outcomes, to a procedural fairness model that views procedures
as an important source of largely symbolic information: information about one’s relationship with valued social groups.
Each of these developments has moved psychologists further
away from the proposition that outcomes are critical determinants of procedural fairness judgments.
Psychologists have also demonstrated that procedural fairness judgments themselves have important social and legal consequences. For example, Tyler conducted large-scale surveys of
Chicago, Illinois and Oakland, California residents.7 Across
four studies, Tyler showed that process concerns were more
important than instrumental concerns in shaping citizens’ evaluations of the police and courts. Judgments about the fairness
with which the police and courts exercised their authority predicted citizens’ confidence in and support for legal authorities,
their perceived obligation to obey the law, and their willingness
to cooperate with legal authorities and legal institutions in the
future—findings that have been replicated in numerous studies
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and other legal authorities, and this procedural fairness effect
often trumps the effect of distributive fairness and outcome
favorability.10 When procedural features like trust, neutrality,
respectful treatment, and voice increase procedural fairness
judgments, this functions as a non-coercive means to increase
compliance with the law and cooperation with legal authorities.
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NEW FINDINGS IN PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS: DECISION
MAKERS VS. DECISION RECIPIENTS

Several studies have suggested the dominant influence of
procedural fairness on satisfaction may not apply equally to all
actors in the legal system. Some studies suggest that, among
decision makers (e.g., judges), fairness and satisfaction judgments are shaped by quite different factors and are not dominated by treatment and relational concerns. For example,
Lissak and Sheppard found that managers tended to emphasize
cost and efficiency more strongly than fairness as criteria for
resolving organizational conflict.11 Some early procedural fairness research also suggested that when assessing their satisfaction with dispute resolution procedures or outcomes, decision
makers were more influenced by instrumental criteria (such as
control over decisions and financial considerations), and less
concerned with relational criteria (such as treatment and trustworthiness), than were decision recipients.12
One recent paper focused directly on judgments of procedural fairness by judges.13 Heuer and his colleagues point to
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several cases in which the
Supreme Court was considering the propriety of police
search procedures and in
which the Justices appear to
have relied heavily on search
outcomes rather than procedural fairness. For example,
the Supreme Court has considered whether the use of
drug courier profiles in U.S.
airports violated a passenger’s
Fourth Amendment rights.14
In these cases, the courts described their decision-making task
as a balancing of several considerations, including the risk of
false positive errors and the harms they inflict on search targets, versus the societal benefits achieved by using the profiling technique.15 In other words, the Justices describe their own
decision making as a utilitarian balancing of outcome concerns: societal benefits against individual harms.
This judicial reasoning poses a challenge to the procedural
fairness theorizing described above, which has emphasized the
dominant influence of procedures and which has gradually
moved away from characterizing procedures as instruments for
obtaining fair or beneficial outcomes, to characterizing procedures as symbols—cues to social relationships and group
standing.
The tension between these contrasting perspectives was the
starting point for the Heuer et al16 inquiry. If a decision
maker–decision recipient disparity in concerns with procedures
versus outcomes exists, it could have important ramifications:
decision makers’ best efforts to act fairly might leave decision
recipients feeling unfairly treated, with all of the attendant
negative consequences. The findings of their four studies, summarized below, suggest the presence of this disparity.

[Judges']
procedural
fairness and
outcome fairness
judgments were
largely determined
by outcomes,
rather than by
procedural criteria.

THE IMPORTANCE OF OUTCOMES AMONG JUDGES

In the first two studies, state appellate court judges (Study 1)
and state trial court judges (Study 2) read a summary of a fictitious appellate case involving a search and seizure. The appellant in this case had been required to answer a series of questions before boarding a flight, and his answers were analyzed
using a technology called Voice Stress Analysis (VSA). Because
his responses indicated stress, federal agents searched his luggage, and the passenger was arrested when they discovered illegal materials in his possession. The summary indicated that the
defendant was convicted, and was presently appealing his conviction on the grounds that the interrogation procedure violated his Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable
search and seizure. The case summary described the search procedure and the search outcome. However, the information that
participants received about these two factors varied depending
on their randomly assigned experimental condition.

14. E.g., U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 US. 544 (1980); Reid v. Georgia, 448
U.S. 438 (1980); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); U.S. v.
Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); U.S. v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Half of the judges read a case in which the procedure was
administered in a respectful manner: The defendant was permitted to explain why he was triggering the VSA, and the
police treated him politely. The remaining judges read a case in
which the procedure was administered in a disrespectful manner: The defendant was not permitted to explain why he was
triggering the VSA, and the police treated him rudely and with
some hostility.
Similarly, half of the judges read a case summary in which
the outcome of the search was of high societal benefit: Upon
searching the passenger’s luggage, the officers found a .45 caliber pistol. In addition, these judges learned that there had
been 130 attempted airline hijackings in the past year, and the
state’s attorney pointed out that VSA was expected to cut the
rate of such attempts in half. The other half of judges read a
summary in which the outcome of the search was of relatively
low societal benefit: The officers’ search revealed one marijuana
cigarette (Study 1) or several stolen credit cards (Study 2).
These judges also learned that there had been four attempted
airline hijacking attempts in the past year, and the state’s attorney pointed out that VSA was expected to cut the rate of such
attempts in half.
The judges completed a questionnaire about their reactions
to this case, and their likely decisions in this appeal. They also
answered questions about the way that the defendant was
treated by the police, the costs and benefits of the search, the
fairness of the search procedure, and the outcome of the search.
Both of these studies indicated that these judges evaluated
procedures and reasoned about fairness in a different way than
typically has been reported in the procedural fairness literature. Among these judges, the (high vs. low) societal benefit
produced by the search influenced their decisions, and this
effect was completely due to the judges’ perceptions of outcome fairness. In other words, when the benefit to society was
high (i.e., when a gun was found, as opposed to a joint of marijuana or stolen credit cards), judges considered the outcome
of the search procedure to be more fair, and this increased the
likelihood that they would uphold the appellant’s conviction.
In addition, neither of these studies found any evidence that
the description of the search procedure—the variable typically
shown to be a powerful determinant of procedural evaluations
among decision recipients—influenced these judges’ decisions
once the outcome was known.
In short, the judges’ procedural evaluations in these experimental scenarios were more heavily influenced by outcome
fairness than by procedural fairness, and both their procedural
fairness and outcome fairness judgments were largely determined by outcomes, rather than by procedural criteria. These
findings are suggestive of a decision maker-decision recipient
disparity in the criteria that shape procedural fairness and satisfaction. However, they are based exclusively on fairness reasoning among decision makers. The claim for the existence of
a disparity that is a function of one’s role in an encounter as

15. JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE
CASES AND MATERIALS (3d ed. 1994).
16. Heuer et al., supra note 13.

AND

LAW:

either a decision maker or a decision recipient would be more
convincing if decision makers and decision recipients were
shown to respond differently to procedures and outcomes
when confronted with a common scenario in a single experimental design. This was the goal of Studies 3 and 4 and by
Heuer et al.17 In these follow-up studies, decision makers and
decision recipients evaluated procedures that were: (a) more or
less respectful responses to (b) more or less serious threats to
a social group. These studies tested the authors’ predictions
that: (1) outcome concerns would have a stronger influence on
the procedural evaluations of decision makers than decision
recipients, and (2) procedural concerns would have a stronger
influence on the procedural evaluations of decision recipients
than decision makers.
Study 3 also addressed another important limitation of the
studies described above. Studies 1 and 2 revealed that judges
were more focused on outcome concerns than procedural
ones—however, this could be due to a number of factors. For
example, the judges surveyed in Studies 1 and 2 tended to be
older than the undergraduate populations that typically participate in procedural fairness studies, and Finkel18 has shown
that an emphasis on outcomes in fairness judgments tends to
become more pronounced with age. Additionally, judges might
differ from other segments of the population on certain value
dimensions, such as power-distance, which refers to beliefs
about the appropriate social distance between authorities and
subordinates.19 In several studies, Tyler, Lind, and Huo have
shown that, when evaluating procedures, people high on
power-distance (who believe that there should be a greater
social distance between authorities and subordinates, and that
societies and organizations function better when there is a
more hierarchical, clearly defined power structure) place less
importance on treatment than do low power-distance people.20
If judges tend to be high on power-distance relative to other
sectors of the population, this, rather than their position of
authority, could be the reason why they placed less value on
relational concerns and more value on instrumental concerns
in Studies 1 and 2.
In other words, judges’ focus on instrumental concerns in
Studies 1 and 2 may not be the result of a disparity between
decision makers and decision recipients in fairness reasoning, but may instead be the result of a disparity between older
and younger people in fairness reasoning, or a disparity
between high and low power-distance people in fairness reasoning. Since Studies 1 and 2 simply surveyed judges on their
reactions to the appellate case, these studies cannot rule out
the possibility that judges’ focus on outcome concerns is due
to age or power-distance, rather than their role as decision
makers.
Study 3 addresses this concern by employing an experimental design, and randomly assigning participants to take the
perspective of either a decision maker or a decision recipient

17. Id.
18. Norman J. Finkel, But It’s Not Fair! Commonsense Notions of
Unfairness, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 898 (2000).
19. GEERT H. HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED ATTITUDES (1980); GEERT H.

in the experiment. When ranStudies 1 and 2
dom assignment is employed,
revealed that
there is no reason to believe
that the participants who are judges were more
randomly assigned to these
focused on
two roles are systematically
different in any way, other than outcome concerns
the role that they were
than procedural
assigned in the experiment.
ones....
Study 3 therefore tests whether
the decision maker-decision
recipient disparity appears in this experimental setting, independent of the numerous characteristics that may be confounded with decision-making status in natural settings.
DECISION MAKERS AND FAIRNESS IN AN
EXPERIMENTAL STUDY

In Study 3, undergraduate participants read one of multiple
versions of a vignette describing an encounter between an
authority and a subordinate. In this fictional case, a student
resident assistant (RA) in campus housing searched a resident’s room after receiving a tip that she was violating campus-housing regulations. On discovering a violation, the RA
reported the student, who was consequently banned from
campus housing for one month. The vignette described the
student’s appeal of the sanction on the grounds that the RA’s
search procedure was inappropriate. The vignettes in this
experiment varied on three dimensions: (a) the benefit produced by the outcome of the search, (b) the respectfulness of
the RA’s search procedure, and (c) whether the participant
read the vignette from the perspective of an authority or a
subordinate.
The outcome manipulation in this study varied whether the
search resulted in an outcome of high or low benefit to the
campus-housing community. In the high-benefit search condition the RA discovered cocaine, whereas in the low-benefit
search condition the RA discovered burning incense (both the
high- and low-benefit discoveries constituted violations of
actual campus-housing regulations). The procedure manipulation varied whether the search procedure was conducted in a
more or less respectful manner. In the high-respect condition
the RA was described as treating the resident in a polite and
respectful manner, whereas in the low-respect condition the RA
was described as treating the resident in a rude and disrespectful manner.
Participants were informed that appeals were heard by a
board composed of student residents, RAs, and a campus
administrator. Participants imagined themselves either in the
role of an authority or a subordinate in this story. Participants
assigned to the authority perspective responded to the case
while imagining themselves as an RA member of the appellate
board. Participants assigned to the subordinate perspective were

HOFSTEDE, CULTURE’S CONSEQUENCES: COMPARING VALUES,
BEHAVIORS, INSTITUTIONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS ACROSS NATIONS (2d
ed. 2001).
20. Tyler et al., Cultural Values, supra note 8.
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asked to imagine the case from
the perspective of either the
student appellant, a student
representative to the appellate
board, or a student resident of
campus housing who was
learning the facts of the case
from a report in the campus
newspaper.
All participants completed a
questionnaire that included
questions about the search
procedure, the outcome, and
their
preferred
decision
(regarding the propriety of the
search procedure) in this case. The findings of this study supported the prediction of an authority-subordinate disparity in
the determinants of their reactions to this case: The search outcome had a stronger influence on the decision among participants who adopted the authority perspective, while the search
procedure had a stronger influence on the decision among participants who adopted the subordinate perspective.
Furthermore, procedural fairness did not have a significant
influence on the decision of authorities, thus replicating this
finding from Studies 1 and 2.
As noted above, Study 3 differs from the Studies 1 and 2 in
its use of an experimental design, and random assignment of
participants to take the perspective of either an authority or a
subordinate in the experimental scenario. Since participants in
this study were randomly assigned to take the role of either the
authority or the subordinate, we have no reason to believe that
the participants in these two roles are systematically different
in any way, other than the decision maker or decision recipient
role that they were assigned in the experiment. Therefore,
Study 3 is important because it demonstrates that the authorities’ outcome focus is not a byproduct of other factors such as
age or power-distance, which were controlled for in this random assignment study. Study 3 demonstrated that simply asking people to take the perspective of a decision maker, as
opposed to the perspective of a decision recipient, changed the
way they thought about fairness—it reduced their concern
with respectful treatment and increased their concern with
outcomes.

The studies described so far share an important feature: participants evaluated procedures that had already been effectively applied—that is, the search procedure always revealed
that the target of the procedure had violated a law or regulation. Of course, judges, or other legal authorities, are also often
called upon to judge the propriety of procedures that have
been proposed, but not implemented (a recent lawsuit filed in
the Federal District Court in Honolulu has requested a

restraining order prohibiting the European Center for Nuclear
Research, or CERN, from proceeding with its work on the
Large Hadron Collider in order to prevent a considerable
anticipated threat: that that collider could produce a tiny black
hole which could eat the Earth). With the goal of addressing
the role of fairness and outcomes for anticipated procedures as
well as procedures already implemented, in Study 4 authorities
and subordinates evaluated a procedure that had been proposed to respond to a health threat to their workplace.
Asking participants to evaluate a proposed procedure,
rather than one that has already been executed, allows one
additional limitation of Studies 1-3 to be addressed:
Participants in these first three studies read about a procedure
directed toward someone who was known to have violated a
law (Studies 1 and 2) or a community regulation (Study 3). It
is possible that the authorities in these studies were less concerned with the target’s treatment because their offense rendered them undeserving of respectful treatment. This deservingness view of procedural fairness has been supported in several previous studies.21 If Study 4 were to obtain the same
authority-subordinate disparity observed in Studies 1-3, we
could be more confident that this effect is not limited to settings in which someone has already committed an offense.
Participants in Study 4 were restaurant managers and
restaurant employees in New York City. They were asked to
read a (fictitious) newspaper story, which reported on a recent
outbreak of Hepatitis A in a New York City restaurant, and
which described a procedure that had been proposed by city
health officials to minimize this threat. The newspaper stories
that participants read varied on two dimensions: (a) the
respectfulness and dignity of the proposed procedural intervention, and (b) the magnitude of the threat the procedure was
intended to minimize.
Participants in the respectful procedure condition read that
all restaurant employees would be required to sign a contract
agreeing to wash their hands after a visit to the restroom.
Participants in the disrespectful procedure condition read that a
manager or designated employee would be required to observe
all employees wash their hands after a visit to the restroom.
Participants in the high-threat condition were told that the
disease was easily transmitted, that its symptoms were nausea
and jaundice, and that few restaurants that experienced an outbreak would be able to survive the resulting lawsuits.
Participants in the low-threat condition were told that transmission was as unlikely as winning the lottery, that its symptoms were a mild headache and scratchy throat, and that lawsuits were unlikely to be successful. Participants then completed a questionnaire in which they indicated whether they
thought the procedure was fair and whether they approved of
its use.
The results of Study 4 again supported the prediction that
subordinates would be more influenced than authorities by
procedural concerns: (a) perceived respectful treatment favor-

21. Larry Heuer et al., A Deservingness Approach to Respect as a
Relationally Based Fairness Judgment, 25 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 1279 (1999); Jason Sunshine & Larry Heuer,

Deservingness and Perceptions of Procedural Justice in Citizen
Encounters with the Police, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN EVERYDAY LIFE
397 (Michael Ross & Dale T. Miller eds., 2002).
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authorities'
outcome focus is
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DECISION MAKERS AND PREVENTIVE PROCEDURES
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ably influenced judgments of procedural fairness among
restaurant employees but not among restaurant managers, and
(b) perceived procedural fairness favorably influenced procedural approval among restaurant employees, but not among
restaurant managers. Study 4 also supported the prediction
that authorities would be more influenced than subordinates
by outcome concerns: (c) perceived efficacy of the procedure
at reducing the Hepatitis threat had a more favorable effect on
procedural fairness among restaurant managers than among
restaurant employees, and (d) perceived efficacy of the procedure had a favorable effect on procedural approval among
restaurant managers but not among restaurant employees.
Therefore, despite numerous differences between Study 4
and the preceding studies (e.g., a shift from a legal context to
a business context, a shift from a retrospective evaluation in
which the procedure’s outcomes were known to a prospective
evaluation in which the procedure’s outcomes are unknown,
and a shift in the nature of the decision-maker and decisionrecipient roles), the findings of this study are consistent with
those of Studies 1-3. These results supported the hypothesis
that decision makers’ fairness judgments and procedural evaluations are shaped by outcome concerns, in contrast with decision recipients, whose fairness judgments and procedural evaluations are primarily influenced by treatment and relational
concerns.
NEW DIRECTIONS IN PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS
RESEARCH

In each of the studies described above, decision makers and
decision recipients adopted different criteria when judging
procedural fairness and procedural satisfaction. Decision
recipients’ fairness judgments were driven primarily by concerns about treatment—respectful treatment increased judgments of procedural fairness and satisfaction—but decision
makers’ fairness judgments were driven primarily by concerns
about outcomes—effective threat reduction and beneficial outcomes increased judgments of procedural fairness and satisfaction. While these findings point to potentially important limitations regarding the generalizability of some procedural fairness effects, they also leave a fundamental question unanswered: Why does this disparity between decision makers and
decision recipients occur? In order to understand why decision
makers and decision recipients focus on different concerns
when judging procedural fairness and satisfaction, we will consider the motivational assumptions of two important and influential psychological theories of fairness: the group value and
relational theories. We propose that while those motivational
assumptions are well suited to the situation confronting subordinates in their encounters with authorities, they might be
less well suited to the situation confronting authorities.

22. Tom R. Tyler, The Psychology of Procedural Justice: A Test of the
Group-Value Model, 57 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 830 (1989).
23. Tyler & Lind, supra note 5.
24. Charles Stangor & Scott P. Leary, Intergroup Beliefs: Investigations
from the Social Side, in 28 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL

PROTECTING THE GROUP
VS. ASCERTAINING STATUS
IN THE GROUP

[D]ecision makers'
fairness
judgments and
procedural
evaluations are
shaped by
outcome
concerns....

According to the group
value22 and relational23 theories of procedural fairness,
respectful, trustworthy, and
unbiased procedures matter
because they communicate
information to people about
their standing in valued social
groups. These theories have
been consistently supported in studies of decision recipients
(who are highly motivated to be perceived as valued group
members) reflecting on their encounters with decision makers
(who are representatives of the group’s values).
On the other hand, decision makers or authorities might be
less concerned with their group standing, since it is clearly
high, and instead more concerned with other issues. We suspect that group authorities (including legal, as well as political
and organizational authorities) are likely to see protecting their
group’s welfare—a motivation that Stangor and Leary24 claim is
a primary human motivation—as a particularly important
responsibility. If so, when they encounter tension between protecting the group and treating group members with dignity and
respect, they might perceive a responsibility to attend to the
pragmatic rather than the relational concerns.
In one recent study, we investigated whether authorities’
relatively greater reliance on outcomes might be driven by
their relatively greater concern with protecting their group’s
welfare. In part because we think these processes are not limited to legal settings, and because we are interested in testing
these effects in diverse contexts, this study, like one of our
studies described above, relied on a vignette that described a
threat in an organizational context.25
Participants were instructed to imagine themselves as part
of a small company as they read a letter written by the CFO to
the company employees. The letter described a financial threat
to the company—the escalating cost of employee health insurance—and indicated that the CFO was considering changes to
employees’ coverage to respond to this threat. In this experiment, as in our previous ones, we systematically varied the
perspective participants adopted as they read the letter.
Participants who were randomly assigned to the decisionmaker role imagined themselves as the CFO who wrote the letter, while participants who were randomly assigned to the decision-recipient role imagined themselves as a company
employee.
The letters themselves varied on two other dimensions: (a)
the magnitude of threat to the company posed by the escalating
costs, and (b) whether the CFO would permit the employee-to
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voice their opinion and concerns about the proposed
changes before deciding on a
course of action (the opportunity to “voice” one’s views
before a decision is made has
been clearly established as an
important procedural fairness
concern26 and has been linked
to perceptions of respectful
treatment27).
Participants in the highthreat condition learned that
the increased costs were sufficiently large to pose a threat
to the company’s survival,
whereas participants in the low-threat condition learned that
the increased costs were moderate and not a serious threat to
the company’s survival. Participants assigned to the high-voice
condition learned that that the CFO had decided to meet with
them before making his decision, whereas participants
assigned to the low-voice condition learned that the CFO had
decided not to meet with them before making his decision.
Because this study was designed to examine why these variables affect authorities and subordinates differently, our questions to participants included measures of three motives that
we expected might explain why authorities and subordinates
differ in their fairness and satisfaction judgments: protecting
the company’s welfare, demonstrating a concern for the welfare
of individual employees, and treating the employees with
respect.
Several results of this study are noteworthy. First, the findings of this study replicated those of Heuer et al.28 Among participants who adopted the perspective of the CFO, there was
virtually no effect of voice on procedural fairness judgments,
but voice did affect the procedural fairness judgments of participants in the role of the decision recipient, or employee.
Further, perceptions of procedural fairness more strongly
influenced the satisfaction of decision recipients than decision
makers.
Second, our prediction that a concern with protecting the
group’s welfare would be more important for decision makers
than decision recipients was supported for both procedural
fairness and satisfaction judgments. Thus, the findings of this
study extend the findings of Heuer et al29 by pointing to
authorities’ motivation to protect the group as at least one reason for their greater concern with outcomes than with procedures.
Finally, two of our predictions were not supported. We predicted that the employees’ fairness and satisfaction judgments

would be more favorably influenced than the authorities’ judgments by evidence that the authority had demonstrated a concern for the welfare of individual employees and had been
respectful. In fact, concern for individuals’ welfare was more
important among the decision makers, and respect was equally
important for decision makers and decision recipients. While
additional research is necessary before we can speak authoritatively about these effects, we offer the following speculation:
We suspect that in this study, a concern for employee welfare
might have mattered more to the authorities because they do
not view this concern as a symbol of group standing (as it is
characterized by the group value theory), but rather as a pragmatic concern for protecting the individual employee’s economic welfare (protecting their job). We think this interpretation is consistent with the general pattern of findings throughout our studies. Second, we propose that respect was equally
important for fairness and satisfaction among authorities and
subordinates because our analysis tested its influence while
controlling for the effect of the CFO’s course of action on the
company’s welfare. Essentially, we propose that once the
authority’s concern for protecting the group is controlled for,
there is no tension between treating employees respectfully
and protecting the group’s welfare; respectful treatment—a
communication that the subordinate is valued by the group—
is seen as desirable by both decision makers and decision
recipients.
In sum, this study replicated and extended the findings of
Heuer et al,30 demonstrating that voice is less important for the
fairness judgments of authorities, and fairness is less important
for the satisfaction of authorities. But the findings of this study
also supported the prediction that authorities are more concerned with instrumental motives related to protecting the
group and its members. It therefore appears that authorities are
focused on using procedures that they feel will protect the
group, rather than trying to communicate a relational message
to the group’s members. However, the relational message is not
unimportant to authorities—in essence, when concerns about
protecting the group are taken into account, there was no difference between authorities and subordinates in the importance they placed on respectful treatment. As long as the decision makers felt that they were protecting the decision recipients’ and the group’s welfare, they were as concerned as decision recipients were about decision recipients being treated
respectfully.
The findings of this study indicate that increased concern
with group protection is one feature that differentiates decision
makers and decision recipients, and more strongly influences
the fairness and satisfaction judgments of decision makers.
This finding is important because it begins to illuminate why
decision makers and decision recipients reason differently

26. THIBAUT & WALKER, supra note 3; Gerald S. Leventhal, What
Should Be Done with Equity Theory? New Approaches to the Study of
Fairness in Social Relationships, in SOCIAL EXCHANGE: ADVANCES IN
THEORY AND RESEARCH 27 (Kenneth J. Gergen, et al. eds., 1980);
John Thibaut & Laurens Walker, A Theory of Procedure, 66 CALIF.
L. REV. 541(1978).

27. LIND & TYLER, supra note 6; Tyler, supra note 22.
28. Heuer et al., supra note 13.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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about fairness, as they did in the Heuer et al31 studies.
While this study has initiated an investigation of the motivational underpinnings of an authority-subordinate disparity
in the role of outcomes and procedures for procedural fairness
and satisfaction, additional research on this topic is needed.
Numerous other candidates exist as causal mechanisms that
may help to account for the increased emphasis that decision
makers place on instrumental concerns, relative to decision
recipients. We briefly consider two potential candidates here.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN DECISION MAKERS AND
DECISION RECIPIENTS
Who Is Targeted by Procedures and Outcomes?
While we have focused on a distinction between authorities
and subordinates, we have so far neglected to consider the ways
in which this distinction is, in most natural settings, confounded
with several other distinctions—each of which are candidates
for explaining the phenomenon of different degrees of concern
with outcomes versus procedures. For example, in the studies
summarized above, as in much of the procedural fairness literature, the decision maker is typically the source, rather than the
target of the procedures under consideration. So when, in the
restaurant study described above, both managers and employees
evaluated a procedure targeted at the employee, the employee,
not the manager, was the one who was to be observed in the
restroom. Thus, restaurant managers evaluated a procedure targeted at someone else, but employees evaluated a procedure targeted at them. It is possible that people will place a greater
emphasis on respect when considering their own treatment,
rather than the treatment of someone else. This possibility
requires further investigation, so that we can establish whether
decision makers’ reduced concern with respect may result from
the fact that decision recipients are the targets of the treatment
or procedures being evaluated, whereas decision makers are not.
The studies described above do not tease apart the potentially
independent contributions of the authority-subordinate distinction from the source-target distinction.
In addition, decision recipients are also generally more
likely than decision makers to be affected by the outcome that
results from the procedure. In one study that examined people’s reactions to a smoking ban, smokers were more sensitive
than non-smokers to the procedures that were used to implement that new policy.32 The same distinction might matter as
judges interact with litigants—by virtue of the fact that most of
the procedures employed by the court will produce outcomes
of considerably greater consequence to the litigants than the
judges, the litigants might be more sensitive to procedural subtleties. For the purposes of gaining a better understanding of
the disparate reactions to procedures and outcomes we have
described above, this distinction should also be investigated
independently of the authority-subordinate distinction and the
source-target distinction.
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tion, and that might also play
a role in producing some of
the effects we have obtained
in our own studies. Most of the existing fairness research asks
participants to evaluate procedures directed at individuals
(e.g., encounters between a judge and a litigant, or between a
police officer and a civilian, or a manager and an employee).
Recently, some studies have begun to investigate fairness reasoning in settings in which procedures are directed at groups
of people. Tyler and colleagues33 point out that some procedures can involve a macroscopic perspective, and Leung, Tong,
and Lind34 investigated whether respectful treatment, so wellestablished as a critical fairness concern when procedures are
directed at individuals, holds for policy and social decisions
that are primarily concerned with collective rather than with
individual outcomes. In a series of surveys that asked participants about large-scale social issues (asylum seekers, an economic intervention, and accountability of principal government officials), Leung et al., showed that, contrary to findings
usually seen with individual-level decisions in procedural fairness studies, collective outcome favorability was more important than procedural fairness in influencing participants’
endorsements of policy decisions.35
In natural settings, decision makers, such as judges, administer dispute resolution procedures regularly, and may thus be
exposed to the wider implications of a procedure’s outcome for
many individuals, across many different scenarios, often across
long periods of time. It therefore appears that, in naturalistic
settings, group-level and societal-level concerns may be more
salient for decision makers, rather than decision recipients. It
is therefore plausible that decision makers and decision
recipients differ in their focus, with decision makers taking
this macroscopic perspective, while individual concerns are
more salient for decision recipients. As noted above, decision
recipients, typically of lower or less secure status than decision
makers, are highly motivated to seek out information about
their status in social groups when interacting with authorities.
According to the group value36 and relational37 models of procedural fairness, treatment is central to fairness reasoning
because it conveys this important relational information. In
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addition, Fairness Heuristic Theory38 posits that fair treatment
is an indication that the authority is trustworthy and that complying with their direction will not lead to exploitation. These
concerns about group status and exploitation may be ones that
are not shared by authorities or decision makers, and above,
we provide evidence that authorities are more focused on
group protection than are decision recipients when evaluating
procedures.39
In addition to affecting the information that people are
motivated to seek out, decision-making status may also change
the way that information about a scenario is processed. Smith
and Trope conducted an experiment in which they primed participants for either high or low power, and found that those
primed for high power engaged in more abstract, less detailed
processing of stimuli than did those primed for low power, and
did so even when this resulted in worse performance on a
task.40 Their findings indicate that high power leads people to
view stimuli in a different way, focusing on gist and “big picture” trends rather than details, and categorizing events
broadly. If those with legal decision authority are more focused
on group-level and societal-level concerns than are decision
recipients, this may influence the way that they process information, as well as the information that they attend to, when
evaluating a legal procedure. In line with the findings of Leung
et al,41 this group-level focus may result in an emphasis on collective outcome favorability when evaluating procedures.
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Thus far, the research suggests that decision makers are less
affected by procedural concerns than are decision recipients.
In three of four studies conducted by Heuer et al,42 there was
no effect of respectful or dignified treatment on the procedural
fairness judgments of the authorities—this effect was observed
only among the subordinates. Recently, we have begun to
investigate why this might be the case, and findings indicate
that decision makers’ fairness judgments are shaped by concern for group protection to a greater extent than are those of
decision recipients. However, there are a number of other factors that might lead to the discrepancy between decision makers and decision recipients, and further research is required to
identify the priorities that occupy the focus of decision makers, and lead them to emphasize instrumental concerns in their

38. E. Allan Lind, Procedural Justice and Culture: Evidence for
Ubiquitous Process Concerns, 15 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE
24 (1994).
39. Sivasubramaniam et al., supra note 25.
40. Pamela K. Smith & Yaacov Trope, You Focus on the Forest When
You’re in Charge of the Trees: Power Priming and Abstract
Information Processing, 90 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 578
(2006).
41. Leung et al., supra note 34.
42. Heuer et al., supra note 13.
43. E.g., Francis J. Flynn & Joel Brockner, It’s Different to Give Than to
Receive: Predictors of Givers’ and Receivers’ Reactions to Favor
Exchange, 88 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1034 (2003); Gerald S.
Leventhal et al., Beyond Fairness: A Theory of Allocation
Preferences, in JUSTICE AND SOCIAL INTERACTION 167 (Gerold Mikula

70 Court Review - Volume 44

fairness judgments, when decision recipients are clearly
focused on treatment.
An important point to note in this work is its demonstration
that the applicability of procedural fairness research is more
nuanced than has previously been acknowledged. While a
number of procedural fairness theorists have argued that the
meaning of fairness changes across situations,43 and others
have suggested that outcome concerns and relational concerns
can be differentially important in different contexts,44 none of
these perspectives have explored the contrast between decision
makers and decision recipients. The recognition that decision
makers’ fairness judgments operate differently to those of decision recipients opens new avenues for inquiry in the procedural fairness literature, and calls for better understanding of
the psychological underpinnings of fairness reasoning among
decision makers, including judges.
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